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Abstract
We investigate dynamic R&D for process innovation in an oligopoly where
firms invest in cost-reducing activities. We focus on the relationship between
R&D intensity and market structure, proving that the industry R&D invest-
ment monotonically increases in the number of firms. This result contradicts
the established wisdom acquired from static games on the same topic. We
also prove that, if competition is sufficiently tough, any increase in product
substitutability reduces R&D efforts.
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1 Introduction
We propose a dynamic analysis of the relationship between market power
and R&D efforts, in order to reassess a well-known issue in the theory of in-
dustrial organization, that can be traced back to the debate between Schum-
peter (1942) and Arrow (1962), about the bearings of the intensity of market
competition on the pace of technical progress. The so-called Schumpeterian
hypothesis maintains that there exists an inverse relationship between the
intensity of competition and the pace of technical progress. That is, ac-
cording to Schumpeter, monopoly is the market structure that should ensure
the fastest and largest technical progress. This relies upon the idea that
monopoly ensures the highest profit level and therefore the larger internal
sources for funding R&D activities. Exactly the opposite view is expressed
by Arrow, since he focuses upon the replacement effect, according to which a
monopolist should be induced to rest on his laurels, while a firm operating in
a competitive environment should strive for new technologies or new prod-
ucts, in order to throw her rivals out of business.While the Arrowian position
measures the intensity of market competition in terms of market structure
(i.e., the number of firms), the interpretation of the Schumpeterian hypoth-
esis is a bit looser, and several versions have been alternatively investigated
in the literature.1
In order to assess this issue, we consider an oligopoly where n firms sell a
homogeneous product and compete in prices. Moreover, they also invest at
each point in time in R&D for process innovation, i.e., reducing the marginal
production cost of the good. R&D activity is characterized by positive ex-
ternalities, i.e., each firm receives a positive spillover from the investments
carried out by all other firms in the industry.
The game is state-redundant or perfect, so that the open-loop solution
is a Markovian equilibrium. We proceed in two steps. First, we charac-
1Influential studies of the relationship between market structure and innovation are
those of Flaherty (1980) and Spence (1984). For an exhaustive overview of the related
literature, see Reinganum (1989) and Martin (2001).
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terize the individually optimal path of R&D investment for a given level of
marginal production cost. Second, we obtain the steady state levels of in-
vestment and marginal cost. With respect to both the optimal path and the
steady-state level of R&D investment, the following conclusions hold. The
individual effort is always decreasing in the number of firms while the oppo-
site holds for the aggregate R&D investments. This result has an Arrowian
flavour, since as the degree of competition becomes tougher, the aggregate
investment becomes larger. This is in sharp contrast with the conclusions
drawn from the static version of the same model (Hinloopen, 2000) where
a non-monotone relationship exists between aggregate R&D investment and
market structure. Under this perspective, our model highlights the value
added of a properly dynamic analysis over the static approach based upon a
multistage game. Then, we also evaluate the effect of product differentiation
on R&D efforts. We find that (i) along the equilibrium path, the individ-
ual as well as the industry incentive to invest is increasing in the degree of
product differentiation (provided that the number of firms is large enough),
while (ii) the steady state R&D efforts are completely unaffected by prod-
uct differentiation. Result (i) is clearly Schumpeterian in spirit, since any
increase in product differentiation translates into a milder price competition
on the market; hence, in such a case we may put forward a Schumpeterian
argument according to which softening competition by reducing the degree
of product substitutability ultimately induces firms to increase their R&D
investments. This of course enhances technical progress.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates
the basic setup. The solution of the open-loop game is investigated in section
3, while section 4 contains comparative statics. Concluding remarks are in
section 5.
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2 The setup
We consider an oligopoly with n single-product firms selling differentiated
goods over continuous time, t ∈ [0,∞) . At every t, firm i’s inverse demand
function is pi (t) = A− qi (t)− s
∑
j 6=i qj(t), so that the direct demand writes
as follows (Spence, 1976):
qi(t) =
A
1 + s (n− 1) −
(1 + s (n− 2)) qi(t)
(1− s) [1 + s (n− 1)]+
+
s
(1− s) [1 + s (n− 1)]
∑
j 6=i
pj(t) (1)
where A is market size and s ∈ [0, 1) measures the degree of substitutability
between any two varieties: the higher is s, the lower is differentiation.2 pi(t) is
the market price chosen by firm i. Each firm produces at a constant marginal
cost, ci. Accordingly, her instantaneous cost function for the production of
the final good is Ci (ci, qi, t) = ci(t)qi(t). The marginal cost of firm i evolves
over time according to the following equation:
dci(t)
dt
≡ ·ci = ci (t) [−ki(t)− βK−i(t) + δ] (2)
where ki(t) is the R&D effort exerted by firm i at time t, while K−i(t) is the
aggregate R&D effort of all other firms and parameter β ∈ [0, 1] measures
the positive technological spillover that firm i receives from the R&D activity
of the rivals.3 Parameter δ ∈ [0, 1] is a constant depreciation rate measur-
ing the instantaneous decrease in productive efficiency due to the ageing of
technology. The instantaneous R&D cost is:
Γ(ki, t) = b [ki(t)]
2 , (3)
where b is a positive parameter. Throughout the game, firms discount future
profits a the common and constant discount rate ρ > 0.
2For a model where s is a state variable changing because of R&D for product innova-
tion, see Cellini and Lambertini (2002, 2004).
3As in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988).
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Firms adopt a strictly noncooperative behaviour in choosing both the out-
put levels and the R&D efforts, each firm operating her own R&D division.4
The objective of firm i consists in maximizing discounted profits:
Πi =
∫ ∞
0
{
[pi(t)− ci (t)]
[
A
1 + s (n− 1)+ (4)
− (1 + s (n− 2)) qi(t)
(1− s) [1 + s (n− 1)]+
s
∑
j 6=i pj(t)
(1− s) [1 + s (n− 1)]
]
− b [ki(t)]2
}
e−ρtdt
subject to the set of dynamic constraints (2). The corresponding Hamiltonian
function is:
Hi(p,k, c) = e−ρt {[pi(t)− ci (t)] qi (t)+ (5)
−b [ki(t)]2 − λii(t)ci(t) [ki(t) + βK−i(t)− δ] +
−
∑
j 6=i
λij(t)cj(t)[kj(t) + β(ki(t) +
∑
l 6=i,j
kl(t))− δ]}
where λij(t) = µij(t)e
ρt is the co-state variable (evaluated at time t) associ-
ated with the state variable cj(t), qi (t) is defined as in (1) and p,k, c are the
vectors of control and state variables.
3 The open-loop solution
Here we characterize the Nash equilibrium under the open-loop information
structure. As a first step, we prove the following result:
Lemma 1. The open-loop Nash equilibrium of the game is subgame (or
Markov) perfect.
Proof. We are going to show that the present setup is a perfect game in
the sense of Leitmann and Schmitendorf (1978) and Feichtinger (1983). In
summary, a differential game is perfect whenever the closed-loop equilibrium
4For a discussion of R&D cooperation in the same model, see Cellini and Lambertini
(2003).
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collapses into the open-loop one, the latter being thus strongly time consis-
tent, i.e., subgame perfect.5 Consider the closed-loop information structure.
The relevant first order conditions (FOCs) are:6
∂Hi
∂pi
=
1
(1− s)Υ {[ci − 2pi] [1 + s (n− 2)]+
+A (1− s) + s
∑
j 6=i
pj} = 0 (6)
where:
Υ ≡ 1 + s (n− 1) ; (7)
∂Hi
∂ki
= −2bki − λiici − β
∑
j 6=i
λijcj = 0. (8)
As a first step, observe that (6) only contains firm i’s state variable, so that in
choosing the optimal output at any time during the game firm imay disregard
the current efficiency of the rival. That is, there is no feedback effect in the
output choice. Conversely, at first sight there seem to be a feedback between
the R&D decisions, as (8) indeed contains all state variables, at least for any
positive spillover effect.7 The core of the proof consists in showing that no
feedback effect are actually present, even for positive spillover levels.
Taking the above considerations into account, the adjoint or co-state
equations are:
−∂Hi
∂ci
−
∑
j 6=i
∂Hi
∂kj
∂k∗j
∂ci
=
∂λii
∂t
− ρλii (9)
yielding:
∂λii
∂t
= qi (t) + λii(t) [ki(t) + βK−i(t)+
5The label ‘perfect game’ is due to Fershtman (1987), where one can find a general tech-
nique to identify any such games. Another class of games where open-loop equilibria are
subgame perfect is investigated by Reinganum (1982). For further details, see Mehlmann
(1988, ch. 4) and Dockner et al. (2000, ch. 7).
6Henceforth, the indication of time and exponential discountig is omitted for brevity.
7Intuitively, if β = 0, then the investment plans are completely independent and there-
fore it is apparent that no feedback effect operates.
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+ρ− δ]− β
2b
∑
j 6=i
λji(t) [βλii(t)ci(t)+
+λij(t)cj(t) + β
∑
l 6=i,j
λil(t)cl(t)] (10)
and:
−∂Hi
∂cj
− ∂Hi
∂ki
∂k∗i
∂cj
+
−
∑
l 6=i,j
∂Hi
∂kl
∂k∗l
∂cj
=
∂λij
∂t
− ρλij (11)
where each term
∂Hi
∂kj
∂k∗j
∂ci
(12)
captures the feedback effect from j to i, and partial derivatives ∂k∗j/∂ci are
calculated using the optimal values of investments as from FOC (8), k∗j =
− (λjjcj + βλjici) / (2b) . Now note that ∂Hi/∂ki = 0 by virtue of (8). Hence,
(11) yields:
∂λij
∂t
= λij
(
kj + βki + β
∑
l 6=i,j
kl + ρ− δ
)
+
− β
2b
∑
l 6=i,j
λlj
(
βλiici + λilcl + β
∑
j 6=i,l
λijcj
)
(13)
These conditions must be evaluated along with the initial conditions
{ci(0)} = {c0,i} and the transversality conditions
lim
t→∞
e−ρtλijcj = 0 , i, j = 1, 2. (14)
Note that, on the basis of ex ante symmetry across firms, λlj = λij for
all l. Accordingly, from (13), we have that ∂λij/∂t = 0 admits λij = 0 as a
solution. Then, using this piece of information, we may rewrite the expression
for the optimal investment of firm i as follows:
k∗i = −
λiici
2b
, (15)
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which entails that ∂k∗i /∂cj = 0 for all j 6= i, i.e., feedback (cross-)effects
are nil along the equilibrium path. Accordingly, the open-loop equilibrium
is a degenerate closed-loop one, and it is strongly time consistent, or equiva-
lently, subgame perfect. It is also worth observing that this procedure shows
that FOCs are indeed unaffected by initial conditions as well. The property
whereby the FOCs on controls are independent of states and initial condi-
tions after replacing the optimal values of the co-state variables is known as
state-redundancy, and the game itself as state-redundant or perfect.¥
On the basis of Lemma 1, we can proceed with the characterization of
the open-loop solution. The FOCs on controls as well as the transversality
conditions are the same as above, while the co-state equations simplify as
follows:
−∂Hi
∂ci
=
∂λii
∂t
− ρλii ⇔ (16)
∂λii
∂t
= λii [ki + βK−i + ρ− δ] +
+
A (1− s)− pi [1 + s (n− 2)] + s
∑
j 6=i pj
(1− s) [1 + s (n− 1)]
−∂Hi
∂cj
=
∂λij
∂t
− ρλij ⇔ (17)
∂λij
∂t
= λij [kj + βK−j + ρ− δ] (18)
From FOCs (6-8) we have, respectively:
p∗i =
A (1− s) + ci [1 + s (n− 2)] + s
∑
j 6=i pj
2 [1 + s (n− 2)] , (19)
ki = −λiici
2b
, (20)
since λij = 0 for all j 6= i, at any t ∈ [0,∞) . While (19) has the usual
appearance of a standard Bertrand best reply function, the optimal R&D
effort in (20) depends upon i’s co-state variable. Such expression can be
differentiated w.r.t. time to get the dynamic equation of ki(t) :
dki
dt
≡
·
ki = − 1
2b
[
ci
·
λii + λii
·
ci
]
(21)
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with
·
λii obtaining from (18). Then, (21) can be further simplified by using
λii = −2bki/ci which obtains from (8), and the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium
price which obtains from (19) after imposing the obvious symmetry condition
cj(t) = ci(t), kj(t) = ki(t) and pj(t) = pi(t) for all j:
8
pN =
A (1− s) + c [1 + s (n− 2)]
2 + s (n− 3) . (22)
Using we may simplify the dynamics of the R&D effort of any single firm as
follows: ·
k = −c (A− c) [1 + s (n− 2)]− 2bρkΥΞ
2bΥΞ
(23)
where Υ is defined as in (7) and Ξ ≡ 2+ s (n− 3) . Imposing the stationarity
condition
·
k = 0, we obtain the Nash equilibrium investment, given c:
kN =
c (A− c) [1 + s (n− 2)]
2bρ [1 + s (n− 1)] [2 + s (n− 3)] , (24)
with kN ≥ 0 ∀ c ∈ (0, A) . The steady state level of marginal cost c can be
found by solving:
·
c = −c [kN (1 + β (n− 1))− δc] = 0 (25)
which yields c = 0 and
c =
AΩ±√Ω (A2Ω− ΦΥΞ)
2Ω
(26)
where Ω ≡ [1 + β (n− 1)] [1 + s (n− 2)] and Φ ≡ 8bδρ. All solutions in (26)
are real if and only if A2 ≥ ΦΥΞ/Ω. If so, they also satisfy the requirement
c ∈ [0, A] . By checking the stability conditions, we may prove the following:
Proposition 2. Provided that A2 ≥ ΦΥΞ/Ω, the steady state point
css =
AΩ−√Ω (A2Ω− ΦΥΞ)
2Ω
kss =
δ
1 + β (n− 1)
8Note that pN = c if s = 1.
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is the unique saddle point equilibrium.
Proof. Under symmetry, the dynamics of control and state variables are
written as in (23) and (25). Accordingly, the relevant Jacobian matrix is:
J =

∂
·
c
∂c
∂
·
c
∂k
∂
·
k
∂c
∂
·
k
∂k
 (27)
whose trace and determinant are:
T (J) = δ + ρ− k [1 + β (n− 1)] (28)
∆ (J) = ρ [δ − k (1 + β (n− 1))]− c (A− 2c) Ω
2bΥΞ
. (29)
Then, it can be easily checked that the pair (css, kss) is the only solution
yielding ∆ (J) < 0 always, while the other two steady state points are both
unstable.¥
4 Comparative statics
Now we focus on the interplay between market structure (measured by the
number of firms), product substitutability (measured by parameter s) and
the incentive to invest in process R&D. To this aim, we examine effect of a
change in n and s on individual and aggregate R&D efforts, both along the
equilibrium path (expression (24)) and in steady state.
This discussion revisits the debate between Schumpeter (1942) and Arrow
(1962). Their respective views can be summarized as follows. According to
the Schumpeterian hypothesis, R&D investments and technical progress are
positively related to the flow of profits and therefore we should expect to
observe higher R&D efforts and a faster innovation process under monopoly
than any other market form. Conversely, Arrow claims that the incentive
to generate technical progress is negatively affected by market power, being
then maximized under perfect competition. The Arrowian position relies
9
upon the idea that innovation is more attractive for a competitive firm than
for a monopolist who, by definition, can not improve his market power.
In order to assess this issue in the present model, we proceed as follows.
The aggregate R&D investments along the equilibrium path and in steady
state are, respectively:
KN =
c (A− c) [1 + s (n− 2)]n
2bρ [1 + s (n− 1)] [2 + s (n− 3)] ; (30)
Kss =
δn
1 + β (n− 1) . (31)
It is immediate to verify that, taking into account the integer constraint on
n:
∂KN
∂n
≥ 0; ∂K
ss
∂n
≥ 0 (32)
in the admissible range of parameters. The above properties prove the fol-
lowing result:
Proposition 3. The optimal R&D investment of the whole industry is
non-decreasing in the number of firms. This holds both along the equilibrium
path and in steady state.
That is, the industry behaviour is clearly Arrowian. If we examine the
individual investment, we obtain ∂kN/∂n, ∂kss/∂n < 0 everywhere. This
entails that any increase in the number of firms brings about a decrease in
individual R&D effort. The driving force is twofold: (i) tougher market com-
petition reduces profits and therefore the funds available for financing R&D
activity; (ii) a larger population of firms means a larger positive spillover
that any firm receives from rivals. Overall, a scale effect prevails, so that the
overall expenditure of the industry is monotonically increasing in n.
Hinloopen (2000) has solved the static Bertrand equilibrium with n firms,
finding that both aggregate and individual R&D efforts are non-monotone
w.r.t. n. Under this respect, the static approach proves to fall short of
appropriately accounting for the inherently dynamic nature of R&D which
is not captured by multistage game modelling.
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Now examine the effect of s on optimal investments. First, note that
steady state levels are independent of the degree of product substitutability.9
Second, considering optimal R&D efforts along the equilibrium path, we have:
∂kN
∂s
∝ − [s2 (n− 2) (s− 3) + 2s (n− 3) + 1] (33)
and obviously ∂KN/∂s = n∂kN/∂s. Derivative (33) is always negative, ex-
cept at n = 2, where ∂kN/∂s ∝ 2s − 1 > 0 for all s ∈ (1/2, 1] . Hence, we
may state:
Proposition 4. For all n ≥ 3, the incentive to invest in R&D on the
equilibrium path is decreasing in product substitutability. At n = 2, R&D
efforts are decreasing in s for s ∈ (0, 1/2) , and conversely for s ∈ (1/2, 1] .
Any increase in substitutability, or decrease in differentiation, damages
operative profits. Hence, the net effect on kN and KN is the balance of two
opposite tendencies: (i) the decrease in operative profits lowers the funds for
R&D activity; (ii) any increase in R&D for process innovation may allow
firms to recover on the cost side what is being lost on the differentiation side.
Proposition 4 says that, if n is sufficiently large, the first effect dominates
the second because competition is too tough and the price is not worth the
effort, while the opposite holds for n = 2. Contrary to Proposition 3, the
flavour of Proposition 4 is Schumpeterian, at least for n ≥ 3: any increase in
product differentiation amounts to a decrease in the intensity of competition,
and brings about an increase in R&D efforts.
5 Conclusions
We have analyzed dynamic R&D investments for cost-reducing innovation in
a Bertrand oligopoly in order to evaluate the influence of market structure
and product differentiation on R&D incentives.
9This is in sharp contrast with the static models on the same topic (see Delbono and
Denicolo`, 1990; Bester and Petrakis, 1993; Qiu, 1997; Hinloopen, 2000; and Lambertini
and Mantovani, 2001).
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Three features of our analysis are worth stressing. First, the game is
perfect, or state-redundant, so that the open-loop solution is Markovian, or
subgame perfect. Second, if we look at the effects of market structure on
innovation, an Arrowian conclusion obtains, since aggregate R&D effort is
increasing in the number of firms, both along the equilibrium path and in
steady state, for any degeree of product differentiation. This sharply dif-
fers from the ambiguous conclusions reached by the static models, where the
smoothing of investment efforts over a long time horizon is ruled out by def-
inition. Third, we have shown that the interplay between R&D incentives
and product differentiation is ambiguous if n = 2, while individual and in-
dustry investments are monotonically decreasing in product substitutability
if n ≥ 3. This, in turn, is a Schumpeterian result. Therefore, as a final re-
mark, we may say that, if the intensity of market competition is measured by
market structure, all else equal, then the answer of the model is Arrowian;
if instead the intensity of competition is measured by product substitutabil-
ity for a given market structure, then the model points to a Schumpeterian
conclusion.
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